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    Reagan’s “Gender Gap” Strategy and the 
Limitations of Free-Market Feminism 
                In  late  November  1982,  presidential  aide  Lee  Atwater  forwarded  to  chief  of 
staff   James Baker a report warning about “one of the most severe challenges 
facing the [Reagan] administration” in the coming year, one that “could lock 
the GOP into permanent minority status.” He was referring to the “gender 
gap”:  1     women had voted for Reagan in signifi  cantly lower proportions than 
men, Reagan’s approval lagged among women, and pundits credited women 
voters with several Democratic victories in the 1982 midterm elections. Polls 
also showed potential presidential contenders for 1984 running “substantially 
better among women than men in trial heats with President Reagan.” Pollster 
Ronald Hinckley counseled that “continued growth of the gender gap . . . 
could cause serious trouble for Republicans in 1984,” while California 
congresswoman Bobbie Felder warned that the gender gap could prove 
“disastrous.” Media analysts contributed to Republican alarm. Adam Clymer 
speculated in the  New York Times  that the gender gap “may infl  uence American 
life in the 1980s as much as the civil rights revolution did in the 1960s.”    2   
 Th  e gender gap off  ered feminists and Democrats as much hope as it 
caused Republicans worries. Former New York congresswoman Bella Abzug 
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saw the gap as “indicative of a long-range trend toward the development of a 
distinctive issue-oriented women’s voting bloc” and predicted that woman 
voters would “defeat Reagan, Reaganomics, and Reagan Republicanism” in 
1984.  3    Th   e Democratic Party certainly hoped so, and went out of its way to 
show that it “stands for and with the women of America.” Presidential con-
tenders vied for women’s support, while the party targeted women with voter 
registration campaigns, gave women’s organizations a key role in shaping the 
platform, and selected a woman—Geraldine Ferraro—as its vice presidential 
candidate.  4   
 Th   e respective fears and hopes surrounding the gender gap in the early 
1980s refl  ect over a decade of profound social, economic, and cultural change 
in women’s roles and family structure, rapid shift  s in public policy and law as 
a result of feminist activism, and the political mobilization of a “New Right” 
committed to reversing these changes. Th   ey are also a product of the gender 
gap’s novelty. While women had supported the “‘less radical’ and/or more 
‘caring’ candidate” since the 1950s, in 1980, “the gender gap began to manifest 
itself along ideological and partisan lines.” Women, an administration report 
warned, “are now emerging as considerably more liberal and Democratic 
than men.” And 1980 was the fi  rst year that women voted in equal proportion 
to men; this new voting power fueled fear that the gender gap would generate 
a political turning point much diff  erent from the “Reagan Revolution” that 
conservatives envisioned.    5   
  Analysis of the Reagan administration’s response to the gender gap not 
only illuminates the infl  uence of second-wave feminism but also suggests 
that gender played a more complicated role in conservative politics than 
many scholars have contended.    6     During the 1970s, anxieties about changes in 
sexual behavior, gender roles, and family structure fueled the development of 
a “New Right,” which mobilized voters around the so-called social issues: 
prayer in public schools, sex education, and especially abortion and the ERA. 
Phyllis Schlafl  y’s Stop ERA, Jerry Falwell’s Moral Majority, and dozens of 
other organizations of socially conservative voters gained a disproportionate 
infl  uence over electoral politics and provided an energetic base of support for 
Reagan. But if “‘profamily,’ antifeminist politics . . . was central to Reagan’s 
platform,” as political theorist Zillah Eisenstein has contended, Reagan 
offered little more than rhetorical support on New Right social issues, 
spending political capital instead on implementing his vision of free-market 
capitalism through tax cuts, social spending cuts, and deregulation—policies 
generally supported by New Right voters, to be sure, but not their top priorities.    7    marisa    chappell      |      117 
If Reagan’s election marked the end of a viable “Republican feminism,” as 
historian Catherine Rymph has argued, it did not mean complete victory for 
antifeminism either.    8    Th   e Reagan administration’s alarm over the gender gap 
suggests that Americans’ widespread commitment to equal rights and equal 
opportunities for women played a role in constraining the policy infl  uence of 
traditionalist conservatives. It also challenges a portrait of gender politics 
rooted in simple binaries—feminism versus antifeminism. Much like “color-blind 
conservatism,” which rejected both overt racism and government eff  orts to 
overcome racial inequality, the Reagan administration’s free-market femi-
nism adopted the feminist movement’s rhetoric of equal opportunity and 
choice while denying the need for federal intervention to promote gender 
equality.  9   
  The administration ultimately blamed the gender gap on women’s 
changing economic role: their growing rate of labor market participation and 
their economic vulnerability amid the collapse of the family wage system. 
It hoped to address the problem in a manner consistent “with the basic prin-
ciples of the Reagan philosophy, e.g. reduced federal spending [and] reduced 
tax and regulatory burdens.”    10     Hewing to the narrowest interpretation of 
liberal feminism, the administration promised that formal legal equity and a 
growing economy would ensure equal economic opportunity. Th  is  rhetorical 
commitment to formal fairness in the marketplace, or free-market feminism, 
was a far cry from the position of even the most mainstream feminist organi-
zations, which insisted on the need for active government intervention to 
achieve meaningful equality. In the end, the administration off  ered rhetorical 
support and a few benefi  ts to economically secure women—those considered 
a good prospect for Republican recruitment. But in supporting retreat from 
active enforcement of equal opportunity, affi   rmative action, and welfare-state 
supports, free-market feminism failed to address the “real gender gap”—the 
gap that continued to keep women more economically vulnerable than men. 
Meanwhile focus on the gender gap ignored divisions among women, that is, 
the relative privilege of some women over others, predominantly working-
class and racial/ethnic minority women, to take advantage of market-based 
opportunity.   
  diagnosing the problem: the “quiet revolution” 
  In August 1982, as pundits predicted that women voters would provide the 
margin of victory for Democrats in key congressional races that November, 
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Women, chaired by Elizabeth Hanford Dole, Assistant to the President for 
Public Liaison. Th   at fall, the council heard “extensive briefi  ngs from pollsters, 
demographers, market analysts, and organizational leaders,” suggestions 
from numerous administration officials, and surveys conducted for the 
Republican National Committee, Census Bureau data, and published election 
analyses.  11     It quickly dismissed two commonly cited explanations for women’s 
disaff  ection: Reagan’s positions on the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) and 
abortion, and his hawkish foreign policy stance. It is a “myth,” insisted poll-
ster Dick Wirthlin, that “women don’t like Reagan because of his positions on 
Women’s Rights,” by which he meant abortion and the ERA. True, a majority 
of women supported the ERA and reproductive choice, but so, too, did a 
majority of men; there was no gender   gap   on these issues, and they appeared 
to play little role in voting preferences. At any rate, the council saw little hope 
of winning over the most vocally feminist women. It considered young and 
baby-boom women who “want to actively change the role of women in 
society” a “low probability population” for the administration’s appeals and 
determined that “the development of policies simply to appease the feminist 
advocates would be counter-productive.”    12     Journalists, pundits, and feminist 
analysts also targeted Reagan’s hard-line Cold War rhetoric and increased 
defense budgets as one cause of the gender gap, and several pollsters con-
curred.  13     Unlikely to convince Reagan to alter his foreign policy paradigm, 
his aides dismissed women’s concerns as misguided. Hinckley advised that 
“belligerent, bellicose, or aggressive statements will tend to increase the gap,” 
and the council merely suggested strategy to correct women’s supposed 
misperceptions and to ensure that “the Administration communicates its 
philosophy in language that women can respond to.”    14   
 Th   e council also hoped that emphasizing the president’s soft  er side would 
win over more women. Reagan’s “personality and style,” as a “man’s man,” it 
suggested, had contributed to the gender gap. Some aides suggested “more 
feminine input into the speechwriting process” and ensuring that all White 
House communications were “sensitized” to the “apparent fact that women 
and men receive messages diff  erently.”    15     Citing Carol Gilligan’s highly publi-
cized book,   In a Diff  erent Voice  , the council also considered ways to appeal to 
women’s “unique values, mores, [and] morality.”    16     Gilligan’s theories seemed 
to lend weight to assumptions that women voters disliked the impact of 
Reagan’s economic policies and budget cuts on low-income Americans, 
prompting recommendations that the administration “focus on themes 
which demonstrate our compassion, gentleness and caring,” with a “possible 
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“deeply held values and commitment to children, family, and the needy.” 
Other suggestions included “special awards for women” in various arenas, a 
consistent female presence on Reagan’s Secret Service Detail, and footage of 
Reagan “speaking before thousands of cheering women” at the National 
Convention of Republican Women.    17   
  Reagan had reason to fear that not all attendees would be cheering. 
Republican feminists were highly critical of the president’s antifeminist poli-
tics, particularly his opposition to the ERA, and the council worried about “a 
sense of alienation and ‘benign neglect’” occurring among them. “It is impor-
tant to convey to women that they can succeed as Republicans,” the council 
urged, something high-level female appointments could accomplish.    18    Th  e 
administration repeatedly touted the president’s female appointments, but 
the council acknowledged that “the [absence] of women in substantive policy 
positions, especially in the cabinet is a factor which influences women’s 
perception of the Administration.”    19    Th   e short-lived eff  ort to fi  nd “qualifi  ed 
women to fi  ll high level jobs within the Administration” benefi  ted Dole when 
she became one of two female cabinet members (Secretary of Transportation) 
in January 1983.    20     But the administration was careful to dispel any suspicion 
of pandering to feminists or capitulating to demands for affi   rmative action. 
“These women had to compete for their positions of responsibility with 
numerous other highly qualifi  ed candidates,” it insisted, and they “were chosen 
because of their abilities, not because of any arbitrary quota.” Th  e  administra-
tion maintained that women could and would advance as far as their talents 
would take them on the supposedly level playing fi  eld of the free market; such 
appointments became evidence of “[the president’s] commitment to equal 
opportunity for women.”    21   
  The emphasis on equal opportunity drew on the Republican Party’s 
historic commitment to individual rights; it also illustrates the infl  uence of 
more than a decade of feminist activism and highlights the council’s ultimate 
conclusion that the gender gap stemmed from “the   changing economic role   of 
women.”  22     In a 1982 article, Dole celebrated this “Quiet Revolution.” Recalling 
her experience as one of a handful of female students at Harvard Law School, 
“ignored by a professor who reserve[d] his questions for the annual ‘ladies 
day,’” Dole acknowledged the “breathtaking change” that had occurred since 
then. Rather than credit feminists, she cited “changes in the marketplace” that 
had allowed women to discover “new and welcome opportunities” and to 
“tak[e] their place beside men in business, government, and the professions 
in unprecedented numbers.”    23    Another  staff  er lamented the very changes that 
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working women to southern segregationists’ relinquishment of overt racism. 
“Politicians that wanted to survive had to adjust. . . . It always hurts to give up 
something you like. . . . Southern politicians gave up a lot in response to the 
civil rights movement; who knows what the GOP will have to give up in 
response to the women’s movement.”    24   
  Women’s changing economic role became the council’s central explana-
tion for the gender gap. It suggested a public relations campaign to dispel the 
notion that Reagan was hostile to women’s employment, which stemmed 
from the president’s opposition to the ERA, his ties to the New Right, and his 
statement during the campaign that a wife in the workforce “threatens the 
very structure of family life itself.”    25     Advisers insisted that the administration 
“make it resoundingly and decisively clear that we accept the new role of 
women, especially working women,” and advised the president to communi-
cate his “recognition of the changing role of women as breadwinners as well 
as homemakers” and “awareness of the particular demands on . . . single par-
ents who work.”    26     Emily Rock, Special Assistant to the President for Policy 
Development, suggested that cabinet officials emphasize the economic 
benefi  ts of women’s employment: “the potential increase in productivity, the 
cushion against unemployment and infl  ation, and the positive eff  ect on the 
economy of increased spending by more wage earners.”    27   
 Th  e women most likely to disapprove of Reagan, however, were those 
with the least money to spend.    28     “Women tend to be poorer, to earn less 
money on the job, and to be more dependent on the government for assis-
tance,” the council recognized. Single women, least likely to approve of 
Reagan, included the most economically vulnerable, “single mothers with 
children as well as widows dependent on Social Security.” Th   e largest gender 
gap occurred between separated and divorced men and women; as Hinckley 
acknowledged, “the personal circumstances of divorced or separated women 
are less stable than those for divorced or separated men,” and these women 
“frequently must look beyond their own resources to keep themselves and 
their families going.” Th   e Reagan administration “is a threat to the supports 
originating with government,” he concluded, thus accounting for their 
opposition.  29   
  While some advisers predicted that economic recovery would be solu-
tion enough, the council insisted that “the Administration cannot rely on 
economic recovery   alone   to improve its standing with women”; “symbolic 
and ceremonial gestures alone” would also be “insuffi   cient and probably 
counterproductive.” Instead, the council urged “enactment of some specifi  c 
policies of direct benefit to women.” Wirthlin also called for “long-term  marisa    chappell      |      121 
strategies and programs” and Hinckley promoted “new, bold, and creative 
ideas,” including “far ranging and far reaching policies.” In fact, Dole saw her 
task as helping the administration “respond effectively and sensibly” to 
changes in women’s role and “to anticipate appropriate policies for the decade 
of the 80’s.” The administration must “build a credible record on issues 
of concern to women,” the council insisted, including “substantive policy 
decisions.”  30   
  What kind of policies would eff  ectively address the gender gap? How 
could the administration convince working women that it was on their side? 
And, given its diagnosis that the gender gap was rooted in women’s economic 
vulnerability, could the administration respond eff  ectively while maintaining 
“consistency with the basic principles of the Reagan philosophy, e.g., reduced 
federal spending, reduced tax and regulatory burdens, [and] support of the 
federalism initiative”?    31     In devising its policy response, the Coordinating 
Council set out to “address the changing role of women in the U.S.” and “sug-
gest appropriate action for government,” but the administration’s free-market 
philosophy hobbled its eff  orts to respond eff  ectively.    32    Th   e result was a set of 
tepid policies designed to enhance choices among upwardly mobile, middle-
class women. Meanwhile, the most vulnerable women, viewed as unlikely 
converts to the Reagan agenda, found themselves on the losing end of the 
Reagan  Revolution.   
  the policy response: class politics and free-market 
feminism 
 Th   e “real gender gap we confront is not political,” Dole insisted, “but fi  nancial 
and legal. It is the shortfall between society’s promise of sexual equity and 
the oft  en frustrating facts of American life.” Women working full-time still 
earned 60 cents on the male dollar, public policies like Social Security and the 
tax system were modeled on male breadwinning, working women struggled 
to fi  nd adequate and aff  ordable child care, and women were a growing pro-
portion of the poor. Yet Dole expressed confi  dence that the president’s tax 
policies and legal equity initiatives would level the playing fi  eld, enabling 
more women to succeed in the free market. “By making the legal system 
refl  ect the economic realities,” she insisted, “we can further the quiet revolu-
tion. We can close the real gender gap.”    33   
 Th   is conviction—that achieving legal equity and adjusting tax policies 
would solve the gender gap, both economic and political—shaped the admin-
istration’s response. Some advisers understood that Reagan’s budgetary   122      |     Reagan’s  “Gender  Gap”  Strategy
attacks on income support and social services contributed to the “feminiza-
tion of poverty.” A few even recognized that women required government 
intervention to ensure access to good jobs, good wages, and aff  ordable child 
care. But the council ultimately concluded that while it must “focus on what 
we are doing to support working women and female heads of household,” it 
was “not necessary to deviate from the Reagan agenda one iota in order to 
accomplish this task.” One of the council’s “basic assumptions” was: “We must 
adhere to the basic principles of the Reagan philosophy.”    34    Th  at  philosophy 
opposed the income support and social service spending upon which low-
income women relied and rejected vigorous enforcement of antidiscrimina-
tion laws and affi   rmative action that had proven necessary to allow women 
the very success that Dole celebrated. In the end, the administration followed 
the advice of Margaret Bonilla of the Heritage Foundation, who urged 
Reagan to articulate the following message to woman voters: “Govern-
ment interference in the marketplace is the greatest barrier to the success and 
advancement of women.”    35   
  Feminists disagreed. By the early 1980s, organizations like the National 
Organization for Women (NOW) and the National Women’s Political Caucus 
(NWPC) had become vocal advocates for redistributionist policies, from 
expanded income support and social services to affi   rmative action and job 
training. They contended that in the face of deep-seated sexism, women’s 
disproportionate responsibility for raising children, and an unequal and sex-
segregated labor market, women’s economic opportunity depended upon an 
activist government.    36     Reagan advisers took a narrower view of women’s 
rights and considered calls for redistribution illegitimate. Th   e council wrote 
with disdain about “allegedly ‘non-partisan’ women’s groups, such as NOW, 
the League of Women Voters and the National Women’s Political Caucus,” 
for example, which had become “basically left-liberal front groups for the 
Democrats” and had “push[ed] the politics of America to the left  .”    37    “ Th  e 
Democrats would like nothing better than to inculcate women, or at least 
working women, with the set of class-conscious/class warfare thinking that 
kept blue collar workers in line for decades,” one adviser warned. Th  e  “only 
way that we can get working women out of the Democratic Party and 
keep them out” was to pit Republicans’ “growth axis” against Democrats’ 
“us-against-them redistributionist axis” and prove that “our strategy for 
growth is correct.”    38   
  The poorest women would be the hardest sell. Reagan’s free-market 
philosophy, his strong opposition to organized labor, and his commitment to 
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unsurprisingly, among women as well as men, support for Reagan was highest 
at the top of the income scale and lowest at the bottom.    39     Poor women “feel 
the brunt of the recession and budget cuts,” and staff  ers worried that cuts in 
“Social Security assistance to the elderly, and of school lunches” cost Reagan 
support among non-poor women, as well, who, according to Velma Montoya 
of the Offi   ce of Policy Development, “perceive the President’s budget cuts as 
lacking ‘heart’” and who “don’t appreciate the counter-arguments of reduced 
dependency, etc.”    40     Republican feminists and a few Reagan staff  ers advocated 
a reconsideration of spending cuts or off  ers of alternative assistance to low-
income women. Hinckley suggested eliminating taxes for the working poor, 
while another adviser advocated eff  orts to provide health care for women cut 
off   of welfare rolls and advised “reversal on previous reductions on the earned 
income credit for welfare recipients.” And African American Lenora Cole-
Alexander, director of the Women’s Bureau, urged the president to “lessen or 
resolve” the impact of those budget cuts on women and suggested that single 
mothers get “priority placement in jobs programs” and training “for jobs . . . 
which are higher paying and will provide self-suffi   ciency.”    41    Congresswoman 
Felder acknowledged that “not all in the Republican Party will support” 
initiatives to help poor single mothers but insisted that the “[political] risk in 
not doing so are much greater.”    42   
 Th  e council calculated the risk diff  erently. Hinckley warned that the 
poorest women, a group that included a disproportionate number of African 
Americans, were unlikely converts to the Reagan agenda. Their “extreme 
vulnerability will make them suspicious of anyone, even more so of someone 
like President Reagan whose image and policies they fi  nd personally threat-
ening.”  43    Th  e council labeled many of these women “Domestic Inactives”; 
they were “on welfare or otherwise supported by the Federal government,” 
“believe that the Federal government should support them,” and were “a very 
poor prospect for the Administration.” Single mothers who were “working, 
not on welfare” were an “unknown quantity.”   44   Policies aimed at helping these 
economically vulnerable women would not only violate the president’s con-
servative philosophy and endanger his political appeal to non-poor voters; 
they would also fail to close the gender gap. 
 Economically secure and upwardly mobile women seemed a better prospect. 
Th  e council targeted working women, whether “minority women who are 
moving into the middle class,” whose “salaries [were] a necessity for family 
maintenance,” or “professionals,” who “tend to be liberal on social issues” but 
may be attracted to Reagan’s economic policies.    45    Th   e class-based approach 
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women in business, real estate agents, etc.” and encouraging “employee stock 
ownership plans [and] job satisfaction/enrichment programs” to workshops 
on “managing money, managing time, managing the family, [and] Jazzercize” 
for working women.    46     It is also evident in the administration’s policy off  er-
ings. Th   e council insisted that the administration could address the concerns 
of working women within a conservative, free-market framework. “Th  ere  is 
no reason why the Administration should be seen as reluctant to address such 
important issues as child care, sex discrimination, equal employment oppor-
tunities, equal pay for equal work, and pension reform,” the council asserted, 
for “issues such as these are not exclusively feminist and have appeal, in many 
cases, across the ideological spectrum.” “Surely,” one adviser concluded, “there 
are creative solutions to these problems that don’t require a lot of government 
interference.”  47   
  Legal equity seemed a promising response. During the 1980 campaign, 
Reagan tried to fi  nesse his opposition to the ERA by promising to “advance, 
guarantee, and promote equal rights for women” by eliminating all vestiges of 
sex discrimination in federal statutes.    48     Advancing legal equity seemed both 
“cost eff  ective” and “Republican.” Barbara Honegger of the Offi   ce of Policy 
Development argued that legal equity would “lift   the economic inequities of 
opportunity created by government” and “advance equality for women in the 
free enterprise system.” Emily Rock concurred. “If government and society 
discourage women from working” by discriminating against them, “the 
economy will be inhibited” and “individuals will not develop individual skills 
that lead to economic independence.” Ensuring opportunity in the labor 
market via legal equity would not only fuel economic growth by encouraging 
women to work; it would eliminate the need for “a welfare state” by providing 
upward mobility for low-income women.    49   
 Th   e council fl  aunted eff  orts to eliminate discrimination from federal and 
state statutes as evidence of the president’s commitment to equal opportunity. 
In December 1981, Reagan had appointed a Task Force on Legal Equity for 
Women, charged with helping the Justice Department identify and eliminate 
sex discrimination in federal law; he also initiated the 50 States Project to help 
state and local governments do the same. Little action was taken on either 
eff  ort before mid-1982, when the administration grew concerned about the 
gender gap.    50    Th   e council insisted in late 1982 that “a comprehensive action 
plan has been developed to maximize the visibility and eff  ectiveness” of these 
eff  orts; it was anxious to put the administration “on the off  ensive,” as “women’s 
organizations and Democrat[ic] leadership have greeted the Project with a 
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used against the President.” Successful eff  orts to eliminate sex discrimination 
in law “can help the President demonstrate his sincere commitment to the 
object of equal rights for women.”    51   
 Th   e council had little evidence of progress. Felder wrote a scathing letter 
to the president in November 1982, complaining that the task force had not 
“eff  ectively counterbalanced the president’s position on the Equal Rights 
Amendment, abortion, and budgetary priorities affecting poor women” 
and blasting “retreats from aggressive enforcement of our civil rights laws 
affecting equal pay and equal opportunity for women.”    52     A year after the 
council promised to go on the offensive, Justice Department official Hon-
egger created a stir when she publicly blasted the lack of action. As project 
director of the attorney general’s Gender Discrimination Agency Review, 
Honegger claimed to have sent three reports to the White House identi-
fying sex discrimination in federal statutes, but the administration had 
taken no action. Honegger also reported that her offer to help with the 50 
States Project was rejected; she was told that the effort was “not some-
thing that the White House wants to expend any financial or political cap-
ital on.”   53   Other administration officials were equally critical; one reported 
that the legal equity effort had “been a lot of motion going nowhere.”    54   
Responding to the negative publicity, Reagan recommended that Con-
gress change a few laws to eliminate discriminatory language. Assistant 
Attorney General William Bradford Reynolds said these changes were “not 
substantial.”  55   
  Cole-Alexander offered a more profound critique of the legal equity 
approach, challenging the notion that removing overtly discriminatory laws 
would reduce gendered economic inequity. Referring to Reagan’s eff  orts to 
scale back affi   rmative action, she implored the president to “more carefully 
consider changes to laws and regulations which impact on real employment 
opportunities for women,” including the Offi   ce of Federal Contract Compli-
ance Program’s (OFPCC) “goal for women in the construction trades.” Velma 
Montoya and Wendy Borchardt, who handled women’s groups in the Offi   ce 
of Public Liaison, likewise urged the administration to resolve the four thou-
sand outstanding complaints women had fi  led with the OFCCP.   56   Rather than 
“removing much of the perceived enforcement strength” from affi   rmative-action 
programs, Cole-Alexander recommended that the president “consider posi-
tive ways” to encourage compliance and chastised the administration for 
failing to support women-owned businesses and for speaking “against 
set-asides to provide procurement opportunities for women with Federal 
agencies.”  57     126      |     Reagan’s  “Gender  Gap”  Strategy
  Velma Montoya acknowledged that “many working women will always 
want more than this Administration is philosophically prepared to give” but 
insisted that “this shouldn’t deter us from continuing to search for ways to 
monitor the quality of the work environment to assure equal opportunity.” 
Her own experience as a professional woman in the male-dominated fi  eld of 
policy research convinced her that it was necessary to fi  nd ways to “assure 
that the ‘old boy network’ is opened to the ‘new girls.’” Th   e Rand Corporation, 
where she served for several years as a staff   economist, changed its policies 
“so that all Rand researchers now learn at the same time” about new funding 
and contracts rather than “the previous way that the news trickled out from 
the men’s locker room.”    58    A ffi   rmative-action policies, from public job listings 
and outreach and recruitment to goals and timetables for hiring, had been 
designed specifi  cally to address the kinds of refl  exive male bias that Montoya 
described. She did not explain how the government might make the work-
place more open to women while remaining true to Reagan’s philosophy. 
 A similar tension surrounded discussions of equal pay. Two decades aft  er 
Congress passed the Equal Pay Act, women continued to earn sixty cents 
to the male dollar. Th   e council recognized that “the perceived failure of the 
Equal Pay Act” had “led to more radical proposals such as the concept of 
‘Equal Pay for Work of Comparable Worth,’” and that “feminist groups and 
liberal Democrats . . . have combined to make this a leading-edge pro-woman 
issue.” It hoped to fi  nd “a good, long drawn out Equal Pay for Equal Work case 
that the Administration is willing to support and publicize this support.”   59   Yet 
many Reagan offi   cials did not believe that the wage gap was a result of dis-
crimination. When six Republican congresswomen asked the president to 
appoint a commission to “develop legislation to eliminate wage disparities 
between men and women,” staff  ers called the idea “ill-advised”; it would “give 
credibility to an idea we know is false—namely, that the pay gap is attributable 
to discrimination and that it somehow lies within the power of government 
to do something about it.”    60     As the Council of Economic Advisers saw it, 
“choice rather than discrimination as such was the dominant factor in 
explaining the wage differential.”    61     Linda Chavez, by then director of the 
Office of the White House Public Liaison, elaborated this position in a 
  Fortune   magazine article whose title captured the dominant administration 
position: “Pay Equity Is Unfair to Women.” Th   e wage gap refl  ected a fairly 
functioning market, she insisted. Women chose jobs that gave them fl  exibility 
and concentrated in fi  elds that “command salaries in the market commensu-
rate with the supply and demand of people able and willing to perform the 
work.”  62     Reagan felt the same way; an EEOC attorney told the   Washington  marisa    chappell      |      127 
Post   that Reagan “told us he was a believer in the marketplace and that we 
would no longer pursue those cases” involving women’s complaints about 
unequal pay.   63   Michael Uhlmann in the Offi   ce of Policy Development advised 
against any move that “in any way, shape, or form encourages the idea that 
it somehow lies within the power of government to erase any signifi  cant 
portion of the gender gap.”    64   
  Uhlmann was worried that the administration might get sucked into 
supporting “comparable worth.” “The typical equal pay case is dryasdust 
incarnate,” he warned, and the only cases likely to generate interest are those 
in which “women’s advocacy groups . . . urge litigative strategies or remedies 
that would stretch the law beyond what this Administration believes to be its 
proper bounds.” Feminists insisted that discrimination could be proven with 
statistics and that the pay gap would be narrowed only through comparable 
worth—the reevaluation of jobs to eliminate historic and deep-rooted under-
valuing of female-dominated job categories. Th   e council advised “an internal 
study” of comparable worth, hoping that it might be able to “defi  ne the con-
cept in a manner consistent with the Administration’s goals,” but comparable 
worth, others concluded, “is nothing less than the elimination of a market 
economy in the labor sector.” Tackling the issue of equal pay, Uhlmann 
warned, would merely “give unnecessary aid and comfort to a philosophy 
which is fundamentally opposed to that of the President.”    65   
 Th   e council urged the administration to address working mothers’ need 
for child care, but it again struggled to remain within a free-market ethos. 
Like comparable worth, Rock insisted, “federally funded child care . . . 
require[s] interference in the free market and attack[s] concepts of personal 
responsibility and the traditional family.” Th   e council recommended “a public 
eff  ort to encourage [state and local] governments to relax . . . restrictions,” or 
regulations that they suspected might deter the creation of child-care centers, 
along with eff  orts to encourage private-sector child-care centers. Montoya 
recommended encouraging states to require “workfare” participants to pro-
vide child-care services. Finally, the council fl  aunted the administration’s 
most successful child-care eff  ort: tax incentives. Th   e Economic Recovery Tax 
Act of 1981 increased child-care tax credits for working parents and provided 
tax exemption for employer child-care contributions. Here, Dole insisted, 
the administration was off  ering “more than verbal solidarity with working 
women.” Th   is was “compassion women can put in the bank.”    66   
  Too much encouragement of maternal employment, though, posed a 
political dilemma. Th  e council recognized that the “Schlafl  y constituency” 
and “Christian women’s groups” formed an energetic base for the president   128      |     Reagan’s  “Gender  Gap”  Strategy
and wanted to avoid “ignor[ing] or alienat[ing] married women who stay 
home.” In a meeting with Phyllis Schlafl  y’s Eagle Forum Leadership Conference, 
the council emphasized the Homemaker IRA in Reagan’s tax bill. By allowing 
workers to create tax-exempt retirement accounts for their nonworking 
spouses, this reform “will aid non-paid spouses who work as homemakers.” 
Th   e administration also touted the “virtual elimination of the estate tax” as 
“of particular benefi  t to women,” who tend to outlive their husbands, and 
declining infl  ation, which would “make it easier for women to work as home-
makers if they wish to,” for “by slowing the growth of family expenditures, 
lower infl  ation rates will return to [women] the choice of whether or not to 
work outside the home.”    67   
 Th  at language epitomized the administration’s free-market feminism, 
which celebrated maximum choice in an unfettered free market. Appealing to 
upwardly mobile professional women and traditionalist housewives at the 
same time, the administration insisted that “more than anything else, women 
need a   sound economy   that will provide opportunities both in the market 
place and at home” along with “  legal equity  —the removal of artifi  cial barriers 
that prevent women from making choices.”    68    Th   e administration claimed to 
have delivered. “For women who wish to enter the job market or advance in 
their careers, the President has sought to remove barriers and disincentives to 
employment,” an Issue Update declared. “For women who wish to concen-
trate on their roles as wives, mothers and homemakers, he has implemented 
economic policies which will allow them to more easily do so.” Th  e  president, 
the Update continued, “recognizes the value and reward both in raising a 
family and in working outside the home” and his policies would “lessen the 
economic pressures that could force women to choose one or the other 
against their preferences.”    69   
  Reagan’s free-market feminism applied only to women who had the 
means to make such choices. Cuts in Aid to Families with Dependant Children 
(AFDC) denied poor single mothers the choice to act as full-time home-
makers, while changes in welfare work incentives and cuts in Medicaid and 
job-training programs limited their ability to secure jobs that could lift   their 
families out of poverty. Despite the claim that tax breaks for child-care expenses 
would “go a long way toward helping women achieve greater fi  nancial inde-
pendence and security—especially for the growing number of working 
mothers who are the heads of single-parent households,” the administration’s 
approach to child care primarily benefi  ted middle- and upper-income fam-
ilies.  70     Reagan converted Title XX—the largest federal source of child-care 
funding—into a lesser block grant, trimmed the Child Care Food Program,  marisa    chappell      |      129 
and eliminated the requirement that states match federal child-care funds, 
leading to “a significant reduction in the availability of money to support 
child care services directly.”    71   
 Th   e administration’s press guide on the “feminization of poverty” reveals 
the class bias of free-market feminism. When confronted with questions 
about women’s poverty, offi   cials were encouraged to defl  ect blame from bud-
get cuts and attribute the phenomenon to “changes in moral values, infl  ation, 
and the decline of private sector productivity.” Th   e guide claimed that Reagan 
was helping poor women by reducing infl  ation, which was “of greatest help to 
medium- and low-income women, especially those who head single-parent 
households.” It celebrated tax policies that may have provided a modicum of 
additional income for some low-income women but that were largely irrele-
vant for poor single mothers. Free-market feminism—choices enhanced via 
deregulation, tax and spending cuts, and tax breaks—had little to off  er low-
income women.    72     
 conclusion 
 Th   e Coordinating Council had a short and “fi  tful existence.” Within a year of 
its founding, the council “was virtually disbanded” when Dole became Secre-
tary of Transportation. Deputy Chief of Staff   Michael K. Deaver created a 
new working group on women’s issues and allied with Republican women in 
the House to increase the child-care tax credit and tax breaks for the Home-
maker IRA, but Reagan’s Department of Treasury and Offi   ce of Management 
and Budget resisted these increases as too costly.    73     With Reagan’s comfortable 
victory in 1984, the administration no longer saw the need to court women 
voters as women. 
  However short-lived, the administration’s discussion of the gender gap 
off  ers a fruitful arena for examining the tensions within the Republican Party 
around women’s changing roles. Historians have sometimes simplifi  ed the 
role of gender in the politics of the 1970s and 1980s, emphasizing a sharp 
distinction between feminists and antifeminists, but some of Reagan’s staff  ers 
and other Republican feminists challenged his overtly antifeminist positions, 
and they used the gender gap to push the administration to live up to its 
rhetorical commitment to equal opportunity. But they were constrained by 
the administration’s conservative philosophy. When, at the 1984 Republican 
National Convention, Dole described President Reagan as “a man who gives 
women ‘choices’ and opportunity rather than ‘promises,’” she employed the 
language of feminism to celebrate women’s progress in the free market and to   130      |     Reagan’s  “Gender  Gap”  Strategy
condemn Democrats’ stated commitment to a more active federal role in 
advancing women’s legal and economic equality.   74   If such advocacy restrained 
the policy advances of traditionalist conservatives, it had little success in 
convincing Reagan to support federal eff  orts to level the economic playing 
fi  eld or to enhance gender equality, particularly for economically vulnerable 
women.  75   
  In the decades since, the Republican Party has increasingly offered a 
place to women who hew to a conservative, free-market ethos. Women have 
achieved a growing presence in conservative policy circles, as pundits in con-
servative media outlets, and as Republican candidates and offi   ceholders.    76   
New organizations, such as the Independent Women’s Forum, established in 
1992, promote “free markets, limited government, and individual responsi-
bility” and work to “combat the all-too-common presumption that women 
want and benefi  t from big government, and build awareness of the ways that 
women are better served by greater economic freedom.”    77    Whether  they 
subscribe to “equity feminism” or “free-market feminism” or reject the term 
“feminism” completely, these spokeswomen insist that women’s interests are 
best served by tax cuts, social-spending cuts, and deregulation.    78    H a r d l y   n e w,  
this position has roots in the Reagan administration’s response to the gender 
gap and Republican women’s eff  orts to reconcile feminist commitment to 
gender equality with a conservative economic agenda. As in the Reagan 
administration, free-market feminism today coexists with a more explicitly 
antifeminist politics in the Republican Party, off  ers a way to appeal to women 
voters in a society profoundly altered by the feminist revolution of the 1960s 
and 1970s, and promotes policies that ignore long-standing structural 
inequalities and deepen economic divisions among women.    79     
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